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  Abstract 
  In this note I estimate and compare Tullock- and Hirshleifer-style contest success 
functions (CSFs) using data from the 4 major American sports leagues. I find that Tullock CSFs 
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   1 Introduction
Contest success functions (CSFs) are an essential part of the economic analysis of contests,
as they describe the relationship between the e⁄orts participants invest in a contest and their
consequent chances of winning. In the literature two major types of CSF have emerged. The ￿rst
(and most popular) type relates the probability of success to the relative e⁄orts participants exert
in a contest. This type is commonly referred to as the Tullock CSF, after Tullock (1980). In the
second class of CSFs the absolute di⁄erence of participant e⁄orts determines their probability
of success. This class is commonly referred to as di⁄erence￿ form or Hirshleifer CSFs, because
Hirshleifer (1989) introduced them. Several theoretical contributions discuss the use of both
types of CSFs and their application in more detail (see e.g. Skaperdas (1996), Hirshleifer (1989)
and Alcalde & Dahm (2007)). However, the empirical question whether real-life contests behave
according to either one of these CSFs remains unanswered.
To the best of my knowledge this note presents the ￿rst empirical assessment of Tullock
and Hirshleifer CSFs, using real-life contests. Sports leagues o⁄er an excellent testing ground
for contest theory, as they provide a large number of contests between di⁄erent parties with a
￿xed set of rules. In this sense the "technology" of the contest and with it the CSF remains
unchanged. I rely on a dataset containing over 65.000 ￿xtures from the American major sports
leagues (NFL, MLB, NBA and NHL) to estimate both classes of CSF and compare their ￿t. I
￿nd that Tullock CSFs ￿t the data better than Hirshleifer CSFs in all sports and for all tested
models. The ￿t of the Tullock models is signi￿cantly better for the NBA, NFL and in one
case for the MLB, while the di⁄erence in the NHL falls short of being signi￿cant. A second
observation from the estimates is that home-advantage results in asymmetric CSFs in all sports.
This means home teams have to put in less e⁄ort (measured as player wage expenditures) to
obtain a similar probability of success than their visiting counterparts. These results in general
con￿rm the CSFs used in most economic models of sports (see Szymanski (2003)).
A ￿rst section of this note contains some background on the Tullock and Hirshleifer CSFs I
estimate. Then section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4 ￿nally presents the empirical results.
12 Theory
2.1 Tullock￿ s ratio-form CSF
The ratio-form CSF I estimate goes back to the seminal paper by Tullock (1980). Skaperdas
(1996), Clark & Riis (1998) and Kooreman & Schoonbeek (1997) have provided a sound theo-
retical foundation for this functional form, using di⁄erent axioms to derive it. It has also been
the most popular CSF in the economic analysis of sports (see Szymanski (2003) for more on
this). For my application I specify the probability of the home team winning as










Ih and Ia represent the e⁄orts (investments) of the home and away team respectively. Both
￿ parameters indicate the return on investment in terms of winning probability, with high ￿￿ s
indicating higher returns. The ￿ is a measure for the asymmetry of the contest. A larger ￿
means home-advantage plays a more important role. I estimate four di⁄erent forms of (1). In
model (a) I restrict the contest to be symmetric, meaning that ￿ = 1 and ￿h = ￿a. Under (b) I
allow for asymmetry by giving up the equality of both ￿￿ s, keeping ￿ = 1. In this case I expect
to ￿nd ￿a < ￿h, if home advantage is present. Under model (c) I allow for ￿ 6= 1, but keep
￿h = ￿a. In this case home advantage would mean to ￿nd ￿ > 1. Finally, model (d) presents
the unrestricted estimation of (1).
2.2 Hirshleifer￿ s di⁄erence-form CSF
In order to parameterize a di⁄erence-form CSF it is necessary to scale an absolute di⁄erence
in e⁄orts (which may have any size) into a probability with boundaries 0 and 1. I follow
the seminal paper from Hirshleifer (1989) by choosing the logit transformation. Furthermore,
Skaperdas (1996) shows that the logit transformation di⁄erence-form CSF is the only one which
may be theoretically founded in a similar way as the Tullock CSF. For my model the Hirshleifer
CSF is given by
Pr(win = 1jIh;Ia) =
1
1 + exp(￿￿ ￿ ￿hIh + ￿aIa)
(2)
2where Ih and Ia are again the investments of the home and away team. The parameters ￿;￿h
and ￿a may be interpreted in a similar fashion as before. As in the Tullock case I estimate four
distinct forms, in (a) ￿ = 0 and ￿h = ￿a, in (b) ￿ = 0, but ￿h 6= ￿a, under (c) ￿ 6= 0 and
￿h = ￿a and ￿nally (d) is the unrestricted model. Here the existence of home-advantage means
￿ should be larger than 0, or ￿h > ￿a.
3 Data
In order to estimate the parameters of the models (a)-(d) for both CSFs I construct a dataset
on the 4 American major leagues (NFL, MLB, NBA and NHL). I consider the investments
teams made in playing talent, measured by their total payroll, as the e⁄ort invested in winning
matches. Data on payrolls for all major leagues come from the online database of the newspaper
USAToday1. I convert payroll data to 2009 US dollars using monthly CPI statistics from the US
department of Labor. Data on sports results were taken from the online archive shrpsports.com2.
Getting home advantage in the playo⁄ games depends on previous results, which makes it
endogenous. Therefore I restrict attention to regular season ￿xtures. I also abstract from
￿xtures ending in a tie, because these do not produce clear-cut outcomes. This means I only
include NHL results after 2005, because up until that point matches were allowed to (and often
did) end in a tie. For the other sports I drop tied matches, but these constitute a minor amount
of data.3 Table 1 presents summary statistics of the dataset. The variable home_res refers to
the home team￿ s result measured as 0 for a loss and 1 for a win, while home_pay and away_pay
are the payroll data. Notice that the average home result is above 0.5, which is already suggestive
of the fact that home advantage is present in all leagues.
1see for example http://content.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/nba/salaries/default.aspx for the NBA data.
2online retrievable e.g. for the NBA via http://www.shrpsports.com/nba/teamseas.htm
32 NFL, 0 NBA and 0 MLB observations were dropped.
3league variable mean std dev min max obs season
NFL home_res 0.5700 0.4952 0 1 2542 2000-2009
home_pay 9.38e+07 1.86e+07 5.20e+07 1.54e+08 2542
away_pay 9.38e+07 1.86e+07 5.20e+07 1.54e+08 2542
MLB home_res 0.5393 0.4985 0 1 50074 1988-2009
home_pay 6.14e+07 3.34e+07 1.07e+07 2.28e+08 50074
away_pay 6.14e+07 3.34e+07 1.07e+07 2.28e+08 50074
NBA home_res 0.6051 0.4888 0 1 9717 1999-2009
home_pay 6.44e+07 1.38e+07 2.56e+07 1.22e+08 9717
away_pay 6.44e+07 1.38e+07 2.56e+07 1.22e+08 9717
NHL home_res 0.5563 0.4969 0 1 6150 2005-2010
home_pay 4.60e+07 9094032 2.06e+07 6.74e+07 6150
away_pay 4.60e+07 9094032 2.06e+07 6.74e+07 6150
Table 1: summary statistics
4 Empirical Results
A straightforward way to estimate the parameters of (1) and (2) is to use maximum likeli-
hood estimation. A ￿rst step is then to obtain the likelihood functions implied by both CSFs.

































1 + exp(￿￿ ￿ ￿hIhi + ￿aIai)
￿yi ￿
exp(￿￿ ￿ ￿hIhi + ￿aIai)
1 + exp(￿￿ ￿ ￿hIhi + ￿aIai)
￿1￿yi
(4)
After taking logarithms of (3) and (4), maximization is carried out using standard econometric
software.
Table 2 gives an overview of the estimation results for the Tullock and Hirshleifer models
4(a)-(d) with computed standard errors in parentheses. Clearly, all coe¢ cients are estimated with
their expected sign and size, i.e. a positive ￿h, ￿a and ￿ in the Tullock model and a positive ￿h
and ￿ and negative ￿a for Hirshleifer. The fact that all ￿￿ s in model (c) are signi￿cantly larger
than 1 (or 0 for Hirshleifer) is a strong indicator of the asymmetric nature of sports, favoring
home teams. However, the estimates of model (b) are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent in all cases.
Another interesting point to see is that success in the MLB is less sensitive to investment than
success in the other leagues, as its lower estimated ￿￿ s suggest. The NFL and NHL o⁄er the
largest surplus winning per invested dollar. To get a full picture however one would need to
compute marginal e⁄ects at each point. Home-advantage appears to be most important in the
NBA and least in the MLB. Finally, the reported likelihood values suggest that moving from
models (b) and (c) to (d) in most cases adds little explanatory power.
5League Tullock Hirshleifer (logit)
a b c d a b c d
NFL ￿h(=a) 1.0526 1.0806 1.0729 1.0631 1.05e-08 1.20e-08 1.07e-08 1.07e-08
obs: (0.207) (0.209) (0.209) (0.242) (2.19e-09) (2.20e-09) (2.21e-09) (2.57e-09)
2542 ￿a 1.0650 1.0827 -9.08e-09 -1.10e-08
(0.209) (0.243) (2.20e-09) (2.56e-09)
￿ 1.3318 1.9091 0.2836 0.3141
(0.054) (8.649) (0.040) (0.2365)
likelihood -1749.78 -1723.24 -1723.23 -1723.22 -1750.36 -1725.73 -1724.84 -1724.83
MLB ￿h(=a) 0.2809 0.2868 0.2824 0.2845 4.28e-09 5.35e-09 4.36e-09 4.42e-09
obs: (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (2.44e-10) (2.53e-10) (2.50e-10) (2.99e-10)
50074 ￿a 0.2779 0.2802 -3.21e-09 -4.31e-09
(0.016) (0.019) (2.53e-10) (2.96e-10)
￿ 1.1717 1.0856 0.1585 0.1520
(0.011) (0.356) (0.009) (0.022)
likelihood -34553.2 -34397.5 -34397.5 -34397.5 -34553.8 -34422.5 -34397.9 -34397.9
NBA ￿h(=a) 0.7515 0.7986 0.7867 0.7131 1.03e-08 1.34e-08 1.07e-08 9.87e-09
obs: (0.070) (0.072) (0.072) (0.092) (1.06e-09) (1.07e-09) (1.08e-09) (1.54e-09)
9717 ￿a 0.7745 0.8614 -7.10e-09 -1.18e-08
(0.072) (0.092) (1.07e-09) (1.51e-09)
￿ 1.5410 22.153 0.4269 0.5584
(0.032) (45.47) (0.021) (0.137)
likelihood -6677.04 -6458.16 -6457.95 -6457.35 -6687.84 -6477.45 -6469.28 -6468.81
NHL ￿h(=a) 0.9938 1.0129 1.0066 0.9849 2.24e-08 2.48e-08 2.27e-08 2.28e-08
obs: (0.109) (0.110) (0.110) (0.130) (2.48e-09) (2.49e-09) (2.49e-09) (3.07e-09)
6150 ￿a 0.9999 1.0291 -2.00e-08 -2.33e-08
(0.110) (0.132) (2.49e-09) (3.08e-09)
￿ 1.2576 2.7372 0.2260 0.2537
(0.033) (6.847) (0.026) (0.161)
likelihood -4218.96 -4179.43 -4179.37 -4179.21 -4220.70 -4182.66 -4181.14 -4181.07
Table 2: estimation results for model Tullock (a-d) and Hirshleifer (a-d)
6The common likelihood ratio test is inappropriate to assess the ￿t of most of the models I
estimate, because they are non-nested with the naive model containing only a constant term.
Therefore I apply the alternative test from Vuong (1989) for non-nested models. In the ￿rst
columns of table 3 I compare the Tullock models to a naive model, where the average home
result is used as a predictor. A positive value of the Vuong statistic implies here that the Tullock
model performs better, the p-values indicate signi￿cance. Models (b) through (d) signi￿cantly
outperform the naive model in all cases, whereas model (a) in most cases performs worse. The
last columns of table 3 contain the Vuong results when comparing the Tullock to the Hirshleifer
models. These results clearly favour the Tullock models over all. They are most signi￿cant
for the NBA, followed by the NFL and MLB. For the NHL no result reaches the 0.1 level of
signi￿cance.
Tullock vs. constant Tullock vs. Hirshleifer
League Model Vuong p-value Vuong p-value
NFL a -1.3781 0.1544 1.7180 0.0911
b 2.6025 0.0135 1.6916 0.0954
c 2.6050 0.0134 1.7492 0.0864
d 2.6061 0.0134 1.7653 0.0840
MLB a 0.0177 0.3989 0.0741 0.3978
b 8.8594 0.0000 2.4743 0.0186
c 8.8624 0.0000 0.0614 0.3982
d 8.8634 0.0000 0.0580 0.3983
NBA a -6.7378 0.0000 4.7570 0.000
b 5.5091 0.0000 5.0000 0.000
c 5.5313 0.0000 4.8918 0.000
d 5.5727 0.0000 5.0801 0.000
NHL a 0.3781 0.3714 1.0728 0.2244
b 4.7493 0.0000 1.5453 0.1209
c 4.7554 0.0000 1.0834 0.2218
d 4.7649 0.0000 1.1420 0.2078
Table 3: Vuong test results Tullock vs. constant and Hirshleifer models
7Figure 1 graphically depicts the estimation results of models (a) and (c) for the NBA4, where
the investment of the away team is ￿xed to be the sample average. Both Tullock curves predict
zero win probability for zero investments, whereas the Hirshleifer curves result in a predicted
probability around 0.4 at this point. Consequently, the Tullock curves rise more sharply in the
lower segment. Around the point of equal strength both curves approach each other, but in the
higher segment the Tullock curves increase win probability at a lower pace. Comparing between
the curves of model (a) and (c) it is clear that allowing for asymmetric CSFs pushes up both
curves along the entire interval. Again, this is indicative of the presence of home-advantage.
Figure 1: Tullock and Hirshleifer CSFs (a) and (c) for NBA data
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